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Article 4

STUDENT ARTICLE
An Analysis of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,

L.L.C.: Patenting Gone Awry
By James J. Lisak*
I. Introduction
A patent is no longer what it used to be. The drafters of the
U.S. Constitution, who wanted to protect inventors' rights, probably
never envisioned that patents would have developed into strategic
business tools. Although the types of inventors and inventions have
changed since the creation of the Constitution, the Constitution's protections have not. The courts, trying to continue in the spirit of the
drafters, attempt to balance the inventors' rights and the public's interests.
This note will analyze if an injunction should be granted
automatically when a patent is infringed. Section II will explain the
patenting process, the relevant statutes, the courts' interpretation of
the statutes, and the trends in case law. Section III will discuss and
examine eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.; whereas, section IV
will analyze eBay and MercExchange's arguments. The Supreme
Court decision will be discussed in section in V. Lastly, section VI
will discuss the possible impact of the Supreme Court's decision on
consumers and the Supreme Court's other options.

II. Background
To understand how the Supreme Court arrived at its decision
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., it is first necessary to understand how the patent process works. Following the overview of the
patent process, this section will discuss statutory law, courts' interpretation of the statutes, case ruling trends, and corporations' reac*J.D. Candidate, 2008, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.B.A. Finance and Accounting and B.A. Economics, 2005, University of Michigan-Ann
Arbor. I would like to thank my parents, friends and the Loyola Consumer Law
Review staff for their efforts in helping me prepare this note for publication.

eBay, Inc. v. MercExhange, L.L. C.

2006]

tions to patent problems.
A. An Overview of the Patent Process
A patent provides legal protection of intellectual property,
such as inventions.' In order to receive a patent the inventor files an
application, with one or more claims per idea, with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), a federal agency of the United
States Department of Commerce. 2 After filing a patent application,
the PTO evaluates the usefulness, novelty (whether or not there is a
new idea) 3and nonobviousness (advance over an earlier idea) of the
invention. Upon a determination that these requirements have been
satisfied, which most likely will require that the applicant better explain their invention, the PTO will approve the patent application.4
As a result of the legal protections, many inventors utilize this application process.
During the past twelve years, the number of patent applications the PTO handles has doubled to nearly 300,000. Additionally,
each single patent application can be filed with more than one claim;
in one instance, a single patent had 665 claims.6
This increasing amount of patent applications combined with
approximately only nine examiners per 1000 applications has created
validity problems.
First, each examiner has between eight and
twenty-five hours to read and comprehend each application, double
check for erroneous claims workout any problems with the patent
and write their conclusions. Second, the PTO's interests are aligned
with the patentees because the PTO attorneys typically leave work for
' JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 5 (2006) (providing a comprehensive overview of patents, the patent process, as well as patent litigation).
2

U.S.

Pat.

and

Trademark

Office,

available

at

http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html.
3 MUELLER, supra note 1 at 40, 117, 167.
4 Id. at 40-42.
5 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: A PROPER BALANCE OF

COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 9-10 18 (2003).
6 Patent

Quality Enhancement in the Info.-Based Econ.: HearingBefore the

Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2006).
7 Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Econ. Analysis and Critique, 19

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1030 (2004).
8 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 10.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 19:1

9
the law firms that originally represented the applying inventors.
This has had the effect of increasing the probability that an invalid
patent will be validated and overly broad patents will be granted.' 0
As a result, nearly 50% of the patents granted will not be able to survive a court challenge."

B. Statutes
According to Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution, inventors
have the exclusive right to their inventions in order to "promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts."' 2 Patent holders also have the
right to practice their inventions free from competition during the established time period, typically 20 years.' 3 Moreover, pursuant to Title 35 Section 271 of the U.S.C. (derived from the July 19, 1952
Act' 4), anyone who makes, sells, or offers to sell a patented invention
without authority will be liable as a patent infringer.' 5 Finally, according to Title 35 Section 283, courts ". . .may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles
of equity ...
'6

court deems reasonable."'

on such terms as the

C. Courts' Interpretation of the Statutes
In 1908, in ContinentalPaper Bag Co. v. E. PaperBag Co.
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the purpose of a patent is to restrain
others from benefiting from a patentee's invention and that courts
have the power to grant injunctions according to the principles of equity when a patent is infringed. 17 The Court also held that a patent
gave the inventor an "absolute property" right to that patent, even if
the inventor did not use or let others use his device.1 8 Similarly, the
9 Id. at

12.
10Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1022.

"' Id. at 1028.
12

U.S. CONST. art. I,

13 35
14

U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005).

See July 19, 1952 Act, as amended Pub. L. No. 94-131, 89 Stat. 685 (1975).

15 35
16

§ 8, cl. 8.

U.S.C. § 271 (2005).

35 U.S.C. § 283 (2005).

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423-26
(1908). Note, this case was heard before Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. 283; however,
it was heard under the similar U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3395.
18 Id. at 424-25.
17
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Court held that a patentee is entitled to an injunction against an infringer, even though the inventor did not use his invention.19 Finally,
the Court reasoned that it was proper for a lower court to issue an injunction when higher prices and diminished supply were at issue. 20
The modem court has upheld the decision in Continental in
finding a similar interpretation of these statutes in Smith Int'l, Inc. v.
Hughes Tool Co. 2

The Smith court held that a patent shall have all

of the attributes of personal property and that a court may grant an injunction under the principles of equity. 22 The Court reasoned that injunctions provide the patent holder with leverage when trying to extract a reasonable value for their product.23 Finally, the court
commented that "public policy favors protection of the rights secured
by the valid patent(s)" and that an injunction will be generally
granted.24
To determine whether an injunction should be granted, courts
of equity apply a four prong test. A court will grant an injunction
when: (1) the plaintiff will face irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted; (2) the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; (3) the
injunction is in the public interest; and (4) the balance of hardship
tips in the plaintiff's favor.25
Similarly, the court in Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.
advocated for courts to continue to read 35 U.S.C. 283 literally and
apply the historical four prong equity test. 26 The purpose of equity

jurisdiction was to mold relief to the particular case by reconciling
public and private interests and taking into account the particular circumstances. 27 Finally, the court noted that Congress would have to
rewrite 35 U.S.C. 283 2if8 it wanted automatic permanent injunctions
for patent infringement.
'91d. at 426.
Id. at 429-30.

20
21

Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

22

Id.

23

Id. at 1577-78.

24

Id. at 1578, 1581.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, No.
05-130 (July 25, 2005) (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 14 F.
Supp.2d 785, 794 (E.D.Va. 1998)).
26 Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 866-67 (Fed. Cir.
25

1984).
27

Id.

28

Id.
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D. Trends in Case Law
Even though the cases illustrate that the courts are torn between the inherent differences involving Article I Section 8 of the
Constitution and 35 U.S.C. 283, the courts generally grant permanent
injunctions when a party infringed on another's patent. 29 Moreover,
in order for a court to deny an injunction, a plaintiff needs a very high
level of public interest against his cause of action. 30 These trends,
and the aforementioned problems, have driven corporations to take
proactive steps to protect themselves.
E. Corporate Reaction To Patent Problems
Corporations have reacted to the patent problems by shying
away from litigation and preferring to pay royalties. Corporations
prefer to pay royalties or license the patentees' inventions even
though the patent is possibly invalid. 3 ' Moreover, corporations fear
patent infringement lawsuits because juries are unpredictable regarding patent validity. 32 Specifically, in computer development where
the patents are numerous and build upon one another creating a "patent thicket," competitors change their business strategy, apply for
many patents, and are more likely to surrender to the whim of the
patent holders.3 3 In some instances, shockingly, some corporations
will simply refrain from doing research
or entering into a particular
34
field in order to avoid patent problems.

II1. Discussion
Despite trying to avoid patent infringement, corporations are
still hauled into court. One of the most recent of disputes, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., was filed in Federal District Court in
2001.
Plaintiff MercExchange was a patent holding company

29

Smith, 718 F.2d at 1578, 1581.

30

Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, eBay, Inc. v. Mer-

cExchange, L.L.C., No. 05-130 (Sept. 26, 2005).
31

Patent Quality Enhancement supra note 6, at 9-10.

32 Id.
33 FED. TRADE COMM'N,

supra note 5, at 6-7.

34

Id. at 5.

35

MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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founded by a patent attorney. 36 Plaintiff did not produce an actual
product; rather, it purchased patents from the original patent holders,
Defendant
licensed them, and then sued infringing companies.
eBay and its subsidiary Half.com are online auction sites that provide
their customers with a forum to auction off their own merchandise by
hosting a website for other customers to bid on. 3 8 Defendant also offers a "buy now" service in which customers assign a fixed price for
their goods to create a situation which avoids the auction process. 39
The Plaintiff alleged that Defendants willfully infringed on their "buy
now" technology patents.4 °
A. Court Decisions
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that Defendants willfully infringed on Plaintiffs patents and awarded damages of $10.5 million and $19 million from
eBay and Half.com, respectively. 4' However, the judge denied Plaintiffs motion for a permanent injunction.42 Applying the traditional
equitable principles for injunction, the district court found there was
no irreparable harm because Plaintiff was not producing the product.43 Further, the District Court also reasoned that public interest
was in favor of the Defendant due to the negative impact of nonpracticing entities ("NPE"), and that the Plaintiff did not seek a preliminary injunction. 44 Moreover, the District Court reasoned that if
the in'unction were issued it would only result in additional lawsuits. 4 Plaintiff and Defendant appealed this decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision not to grant a permanent injunc36 Marcia Coyle, CriticalPatentIssue in eBay Case: High Court to Review Injunctions, 28 NAT'L 27, Mar. 13, 2006.
37 Parker H. Bagley and Robert C. Scheinfeld, Patentand Trademark Law, 235
N.Y.L.J. 3, 3 (2006).

38 See Ebay Home Page, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2006) and
Half.com Home Page, http://www.half.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
39 Bagley, supra note 37, at 3.
40 Id.
41MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1326.
42

Id. at 1339.

43 Id.
44

Id.

45 Id.
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tion.46 The Court of Appeals held that a court may deny injunctive
relief only when the patentee's non-use of his patent frustrates the
public's need for the product, such as when public health is in danger.47 Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the fear of future
litigation is not a sufficient basis to deny injunctive relief because
even if the injunction were not given, there would likely still be lawsuits from future infringement of the patent.48 Finally, the Court of

Appeals held that injunctions were not just reserved for those who intended to practice their patents and those who motioned for a preliminary injunction. 49 Defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court, who granted the petition for writ of certiorari requesting
that the parties expand their
question to see if the "Court should re50
consider its precedents.,

B. Defendant's Argument
Defendant argued that: (1) the Court of Appeals' ruling was
inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. 283; (2) property law did not require an
injunction; and, (3) public policy favored Defendant.51
First, Defendant argued that the Court of Appeals' decision
created a per se rule to grant an injunction automatically after a patent had been infringed. 2 This decision was inconsistent with 38
U.S.C. 283 because the statute specifically stated that courts "may"
grant an injunction, not that they shall grant an injunction. 53 Although Defendant conceded that granting an injunction was the general rule, it stressed that there could be no per se rule because aper se
rule would not require plaintiffs to prove the four prongs of the equitable principles injunction test.54 Such a per se rule would defeat the
flexibility that that balancing test of equity requires.5 5 Defendant also
stressed that automatically granting an injunction would not protect
46

MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.

41Id.at 1338-39.
48

Id.

49 id.

50

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 733, 733 (2005).

51Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at iii.
52

Id. at 13.

53id.
54

Id. at 16-17.

55Id.
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defendants if a patent was subse uently found invalid after the perDefendant further supported its
manent injunction were granted.
argument referring to the Roche court that held that issuing injunctions is discretionary. 57 Finally, Defendant argued that it was up to
Congress to change the language of the statute to make permanent injunctions automatic.58
Second, Defendant argued that property law principles did not
mandate automatically issuing a permanent injunction.59 Defendant
proved its argument that the injunctive right to exclude is a right, not
a remedy, because the injunctive remedy has to be appropriate according to equitable standards. 60 Further, the relief for property right
infractions can vary from money damages to injunctions, depending
on the amount of substantial harm. 6 1 Moreover, Defendant cited
Continental in arguing that patent injunctions were the same as 62other
injunctions and that both required applying equitable principles.
Third, Defendant argued that a per se rule violated public policy because injunctions come with heavy fines that burden businesses, they raise the costs of damages, and they allow the plaintiff to
63
hold subsequent contempt hearings. All of these reasons make an
injunction a harsh remedy because it has the potential to force businesses to shut down.6 4 Additionally, the complexity of patents and
the subsequent lawsuits illustrate that patents themselves are flawed
and that automatically granting 65injunctions would remove a tool that
Moreover, Defendant argued that
dealt with the patent problems.
granting automatic injunctions would give NPE's more incentive to
obtain and license patents, rather than produce a socially beneficial
product, and sue companies that infringe the patents.66 Thus, per se
permanent injunctions would only increase licensing costs, create
higher costs to consumers, and lower the amount of socially benefi56

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at 15-16.

" Id. at 17-18.
58
Id. at 18.
'9 Id.

at 23.

60 id.
61

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at 23

62

Id. at 24-25.

63

Id. at 25-26.

64Id. at 25.
65

Id. at 26-27.

66

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at 27.
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67

C. Plaintiffs Argument
Plaintiff argued that: (1) the Court of Appeals' ruling was correct; (2) property law68did allow for injunctions; and, (3) public policy
favored the patentee.
First, Plaintiff argued that the Court of Appeals correctly
overturned the District Court's ruling by not granting a permanent in69
junction. Plaintiff argued that the Court of Appeals did not create a
per se rule, but rather it upheld its previous decisions that granting injunctions was the general rule except for extraneous public circumstances. 70 Countering the Defendant's argument, Plaintiff argued that
the Court of Appeals applied the principles of equity when it distinguished the District Court's ruling, and that irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies (elements of the four prong test) were the
natural consequences of violating exclusive rights. 7 1 Further, Plaintiff argued that injunctions were not reserved just for those who practiced a patent, but they were available to all groups and that patent
72
laws gave the patent holder an exclusive right to their invention.
Moreover, Plaintiff argued that the courts generally look at the policy
of the statute, which according to 38 U.S.C. 283 was to protect patentees' interests. 73
Second, Plaintiff argued that the right to exclude was a universal property right. 74 Plaintiff relied heavily on Continental because injunctive relief was the essence of the right to exclude. 75 This
right to exclude was based on the principle expressed in Smith, that
the purpose of the patent's right to exclude was to prevent others
from utilizing the discovery.7 6 If there was no right to exclude, then

67

Id.

68 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at iii.
69

70

1d. at 1.

Id. at 4.

71 id

72

Id. at 13.

73 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 1617.
74

Id. at

5.

75

1 d. at 3.

76

Id. at 20.
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the purpose of the patent would diminish because a patent's purpose
is to allow the inventor to monopolize his idea.77
Third, Plaintiff argued that public policy favored ruling for
the patent holder because the patent infringer was infringing on the
rights of the "innocent property owner." 78 Moreover, the public did
not have any significant interest in being able to buy and sell goods
over the internet. 79 Further, Plaintiff argued that the patent's purpose
was to give the patent holder a right to his invention and without a
right to an injunction the licensing/selling value of the patent would
decrease substantially. 80 Since the patentee would not receive a fair
value for his invention, he would have more incentive to keep his
ideas as a trade secret, thus depriving the public of the invention and
a socially beneficial product.8 ' Finally, Plaintiff challenged the notion that it was an NPE because it tried to commercialize the product,
but due to a lack of capital and the rampant patent infringement it
was not able to produce the idea.82 Plaintiff argued that the rampant
to put in the
infringement on patents gives inventors less incentive
83
ideas.
new
creating
into
money
and
effort
time,

IV. Analysis
Automatically granting permanent injunctions is not appropriate given the law and the current patent and business environments.
First, statutory law clearly asserts that injunctions do not have
to be automatically granted. As Plaintiff argued, the plain language
of 38 U.S.C. 283 states courts "may" issue patents when the principles of equity are satisfied. 84 If Congress wanted automatic injunctions it would have said so; however, the intention of Congress was
to give the courts the discretion to choose. 85 As much as Plaintiff argued that there is a per se rule, the courts still apply discretion. Plaintiffs interpretation that injunctions are automatically granted is

77 Id.

78Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 4-5.
79 Id.

80 Id.
at 20.

81Id. at
82

29.

Id.at 6.

83 Brief in
84

Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 6
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2005).

85

See Roche, 733 F.2d at 866-67.
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flawed, because it fails to see that courts in rare instances do not issue
injunctions. All previous case law, even MercExchange, stress that
injunctions are not automatically granted. 86 Specifically, the Federal
District Court stated that public health (MercExchange case uses
87 the
term "public interest") was an exception to granting injunctions.
As Defendant pointed out, 38 U.S.C. 2838 and Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution 89 have to be read together. Interpreting
these statutes together illustrates that the underlying purposes of patent law is to protect the exclusive property rights of the inventor and
to promote scientific progress. 9° The Court's current discretion to
grant an injunction exemplifies the intent to protect both the inventor's and public's interests. Moreover, the purpose of the patent system is to allow ideas to flow publicly and not to be held as trade secrets. As the Plaintiff wrote, removing the NPEs' and the inventors'
access to injunctions would only encourage them to keep their ideas
as trade secrets, thereby undermining the purpose of the patent system. 91 Courts support the inventor's property rights because they
generally grant injunctions. However, the courts sometimes do not
grant injunctions because they realize that there are certain situations
where the public would be greatly harmed if an injunction were
granted.
Second, courts need to use discretion when granting permanent injunctions because of the current patent crisis. As mentioned in
Part II(a), 92
the PTO is swamped with patents and 50% of patents are
erroneous. This patent environment strongly supports Defendant's
argument against automatically granting injunctions.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that a permanent injunction is a very strong tool for the inventor to possess and the ability for
courts to use their discretion in granting injunctions is critical when
trying to overcome problems with poor patents. If a court recognizes
that a patent is incorrect and/or if the PTO recognizes that a patent
was granted erroneously, granting a permanent injunction would unjustly hurt the alleged patent infringer who is "infringing" on an invalid patent. Moreover, as Plaintiff argued, with very complex prod86

MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338.

87Id. at 1338-39.
88 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2005).
89

U.S. CONST. art. I,

90 35

U.S.C. § 283 (2005); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

91 Brief
92

§ 8, el. 8.

in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 29.

See supra Part 11(a).

2006]

eBay, Inc. v. MercExhange, L.L.C.

ucts, such as websites where the product is composed of many patents, if one of the single patents is held invalid, it may have the unjust
result of destroying the whole complex product. Defendant countered, that though the inventor has an exclusive right to his invention,
automatic injunctions are not proper, because many patentee's are
taking advantage the current patent crisis by submitting continuances
to entrap possible patent infringers and applying for many claims
within one patent. Thus, the discretion of applying the four prong
equity test allows the courts to recognize the problems with patents
and lessen the problems of patents granted in bad faith or erroneously.
Additionally, Plaintiff overstated that its company, MercExchange, was not a NPE. NPEs take advantage of the patent system
by not creating a product and only extorting money from other companies that actually produce a socially beneficial product. 93 Even
though NPE's take advantage of the system by not producing any socially beneficial product, actual inventors who do not have the large
amounts of capital required to produce their idea should not be penalized by having their right to an injunction removed. After all, injunctions provide the inventor with the necessary leverage to negotiate an
appropriate value for their invention, further supporting the idea that
courts should have the discretion to grant permanent injunctions.
Thus, statutory law upholds discretionary use of injunctions,
the Court of Appeals decision did not overturn previous decisions
making a per se rule, and the current case law allows the courts to use
discretion when granting injunctions. Further, the current patent crisis supports courts' discretionary use of injunctions. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court ruled that the courts still have the discretion to issue an injunction and are required to apply the traditional principles
of equity.

V. Supreme Court Decision
On May 15, 2006, delivering the unanimous opinion of the
Court, Justice Thomas vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment in
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. and remanded the case for further proceedings, without overturning previous precedent. 94' 95 The
93 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at 27.
94 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
95 On the July 6, 2006 remand to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court,

without making any findings or holdings, remanded the case back down to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court decision.
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., No. 03-1600, 2006 WL 2036554, at *1
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Court reasoned that 35 U.S.C. 283 did not intend courts to depart
from applying traditional principles of equity when deciding whether
or not to grant an injunction. 96 Additionally, the Court reiterated that
patents are to have the attributes of personal property, thereby necessitating the application of the principles of equity.97 Further, the decision critiqued
98 both the Federal District Court and the Court of Appeals rulings.
The Court held that the Federal District Court incorrectly al 9
plied an overly expansive interpretation of the principles of equity.
It reasoned that whether or not a patent holder decided to license or
was willing to license did not indicate if the patent holder would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.' 00 Conversely,
the Court held that the Court of Appeals applied an overly narrow interpretation of the principles of equity.1°l It reasoned that whether or
not an injunction was to be granted did not depend on how unusual,
exceptional, or rare the circumstances were.' 0 Thus, the Court decided in favor of precedent and required that the traditional principles
of equity should be applied when deciding whether or not to grant an
injunction after a patent had been infringed. 10 3 In addition, the
Court
0 4
clarified when an injunction should or should not be granted.1

VI. Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court could have ruled in one of three ways: (1)
requiring automatically granting injunctions after a patent was infringed; (2) eliminating the possibility of granting injunctions after a
patent was infringed; or (3) allowing courts to apply the principles of
equity to decide when to grant an injunction. Each of one of these
rulings would have had a unique affect on businesses, inventors, and
consumers. Below are my assessments of what would have occurred
(Fed.Cir. Jul. 6, 2006). The district court has not entered any decisions as of October 25, 2006.
96 eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839.
97

Id. at 1840.
98 id.
99 Id.
100 Id.

'0'eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1841.
102 Id.
103

id.

104

id.
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if the Supreme Court had decided to proceed in each of the three
ways.
A. Automatically Grant a Permanent Injunction
First, there would have been negative results if the Supreme
Court ruled that permanent injunctions had to be automatically
granted once a patent was infringed. If the Supreme Court ruled that
permanent injunctions were mandatory, the prices of patent dependent goods and patent royalties would have risen because the patent
holders would have had more leverage during the negotiating process
and would have demanded higher prices.
Applying a typical
S2
economic supply and demand P
S1
graph, before the Court's ruling, points P 1 and Q2 are the
equilibrium price and quan- P2 tity demanded, respectively. +P.
A
This rise in licensing prices
would result in higher costs
of production and line S1,
D
supply of products, would
move up to S2. Similarly, if
Q2 Q
Q
4
the companies refused to purchase the patents, they would have to spend money to create a work
around patent. This would also increase the cost of production. Such
a move would result in an increase in the price of products to point
P2 and the quantity demanded for the products would decrease to
point Q2.
Currently, the courts grant permanent injunctions nearly automatically, but there is still some discretion. Now, the licensing costs
for products add nearly 30% of the sales value to technological products. 10 5 If injunctions were granted automatically, this additional leverage would allow patent trolling companies to increase 10 royalty
6
prices, thus further increasing the licensing costs per product.
The producing power of the U.S. would have been constricted
and the economy would have stagnated, as was witnessed after the
most recent dot-com crash. 10 7 With less people demanding the prod105

Alan Cane, FT Report: Digital Business, FIN. TIMES. September 20, 2006,

2006 WLNR 16339156. FTREP 2.
106 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at 27.
107 F. GERARD ADAMS, THE E-BusNESS REVOLUTION & THE NEW ECONOMY:
E-CONOMICS AFTER THE DOT-COM CRASH 8

(2004).
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ucts due to the higher prices, companies would have no choice but to
lay off workers, reduce the amount of research and development expenses, and to try to find ways to lower the prices of goods. ° 8 Moreover, some courts have found that if an injunction would result in laying off employees, they are less likely to grant permanent
A decision for automatic injunctions without applying
injunctions.
the equitable principles would eliminate this discretion" 0 and result
in possible unemployment."1 These higher prices would naturally
affect the consumer who would be able to purchase fewer goods, assuming that they continued to have the same income.
If the Supreme Court decided to make permanent injunctions
a per se rule following a patent infringement, the patent holders' advantage in the negotiation process would force corporations to find
ways around the patents or force them to enter into areas where patent problems were not as rampant. 1 2 Moreover, if the patentee was
provided stronger protections in the litigation process, such as automatic permanent injunctions, they would be more willing to bring
suit and the alleged infringer would have less incentive to fight even
if the patentee's patent was likely invalid."13 Such a decision would
have illustrated that the Supreme Court was turning its back on a crisis that needed to be resolved.
B. Never Grant a Permanent Injunction
Second, if the Supreme Court completely eliminated permainjunctions
there would also have been negative results. The
nent
purpose of patents is to protect the interests of the inventor. Had the
Supreme Court eliminated this remedy, the value of the inventor's
ideas would have drastically decreased. The inventor's decreased
leverage would have resulted in many patent infringements because
the only costs to the corporation for infringing on patents would have
been litigation costs. 14 Moreover, patent holders are not likely to
engage in costly patent litigation, because many of the patent holders
108 Id.
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looking to license do not produce their product due to a lack of capital. To illustrate, it is typical for inventors to work independently, out
of their homes, (rather than backed by corporations and outside financing), where as the cost for patent litigation is typically
$100,000.1' Additionally, the decreased protections would give the
inventor less incentive to place substantial amounts of money into
creating inventions, thereby decreasing innovation. As Professor
Mueller commented, if there was no method to prevent "free riders,"
then products would be under-produced. 116 For example, pharmaceutical companies would not patent their new drug discoveries; rather,
they would keep them as trade secrets. However, it is possible that
another company could, through reverse engineering, create a similar
product, but this would require a substantially higher amount of capital investment than simply copying a product from a patent. Thus,
inventors and idea creation would suffer if granting a permanent injunction for patent infringement was not allowed.
In the long run this would
negatively affect consumers because there would be a decrease
S2
in the development of ideas. Before the Supreme Court's ruling,
points P1 and Qi would have P2
been the equilibrium price and
B
quantity demanded, respectively.
Never granting an injunction
would have resulted in the exact
opposite reaction from the first
situation. The lower costs of
01 02
Q
production, because of free riding, would increase the supply and cause S1 to move down. Then,
there would be a lower price of P2 and this would in turn result in an
increase of demand to Q2. The economy would grow quickly and
consumers would enjoy low prices. However, this growth would
come at the expense of a decline in future development, which would
end up stifling the economy and would not promote the purpose of
patents to increase scientific progression.
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C. Discretionary Granting of Permanent Injunctions
In this case, the Supreme Court wisely chose the middle
ground. Even though the money spent on royalties will continue to
stifle the growing economy, this decision will give the courts time to
notice the negative effects of granting permanent injunctions when a
company might be unjustly hurt by having to pay high damages when
a patent might be held invalid.' 7 Additionally, this decision will
provide time for the recognition that the PTO needs to adjust its low
examination standard." 8
Further, this decision will decrease the number of patent applications because the market will force the inventors to adjust their
behavior. The inventors will realize that the value of their patent is
dependent on the probability that it will be held valid. Thus, they
will most likely submit correct patents, as opposed to submitting
many patent applications just to get numerous invalid patents.
Additionally, this decision will positively affect consumers
because the PTO will not be as bogged down trying to correct patents
and the PTO will require less federal funding to employ the necessary
staff to read through all of the erroneous patents. It will also further
science and innovations because, as mentioned earlier, more companies will enter into new fields because they will not be worried of infringing on erroneously granted patents.
Finally, from a public policy stand point, providing judges
with the discretion to decide when to grant a permanent injunction
based on equity confronts the fact that every case is different. The
facts from one infringement can be substantially different from the
other. For example, it is possible that in a certain situation the infringer is judgment-proof, so the only possible remedy available is a
permanent injunction. 119 Moreover, in situations where granting a
permanent injunction might harm the public's health, there is more
reason to impose greater damages, but not to grant a permanent injunction.'
Even if applying equitable principles to each case may
be burdensome, applying the principles is the most just method of
weighing the costs and benefits of certain type of remedies. Thus,
this decision allows the PTO to correct its problem, allows for innovation, and gives judges the discretion to choose when to grant permanent injunctions.
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VII. Conclusion
Patent laws exist to protect the inventor's exclusive rights to
his invention and to protect the public's interest in accessing that innovation. The courts have been grappling with this balancing act, but
the law currently provides courts with access to decide in favor of the
inventor by granting an injunction or in favor of public interest by not
granting an injunction. Thus, as the Supreme Court held, courts need
to balance the many interests and confront the reality that the patent
system is temporarily flawed.

